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Abstract
A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed
in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperinten-
sional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other
accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive proper-
ties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible
with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary con-
nections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that there are such
properties. This paper argues that this promise is illusory. It is not possible to give
an analysis of intrinsicality in terms of grounding that is consistent with these theo-
ries. Given an adequate analysis should be compatible with these theories, it follows
that it is not possible to analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding.
1 Introduction
Two intuitive characterisations of what it is for a property to be intrinsic are (1) and (2),
where ‘φ =df ψ’ symbolises ‘For it to be the case that φ is for it to be the case that ψ’.
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1. Being F is an intrinsic property =df i) being F is a property, and ii) necessarily, for
any x, if x is F then x is F in virtue of how x is, as opposed to how x is related to
things wholly distinct from it or how things wholly distinct from it are.
2. p is an intrinsic property =df i) p is a property, and ii) necessarily, for any x, if x
has p then the ascription of p to x is wholly about how x is, as opposed to how x is
related to things wholly distinct from x or how things wholly distinct from x are.
1Thanks to Stephan Leuenberger, Kelly Trogdon, Johanna Wolff, and two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments on this paper.
2 For any x and y, x is wholly distinct from y iff x has no proper parts in common with y. If a predicate
F expresses a property p, and a name a refers to an x, then the ascription of p to x is the state of affairs
expressed by pFaq, where a state of affairs is a way things are or a way things fail to be. Lewis gives
similar, though not equivalent, characterisations of intrinsicality in Lewis (1983a). A simple and attractive
account of ‘=df’ is that ‘φ =df ψ’ is true iff the state of affairs expressed by φ is identical to the state of
affairs expressed by ψ. An alternative account, endorsed for example by (Rosen, 2010, sec. 10), holds that
there is some intimate irreflexive relation r such that ‘φ =df ψ’ is true iff the state of affairs expressed
by φ stands in r to the state of affairs expressed by ψ. I will assume that, if ‘φ =df ψ’ is true, then the
state of affairs expressed by φ and ψ are necessarily equivalent, which is true on both the simple and more
complicated accounts.
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Plausible examples of intrinsic properties include the properties of being made of tin and
being 1 kg in mass. Plausible examples of extrinsic properties, where an extrinsic property
is a property that is not intrinsic, are the properties of being next to a tin and being famous.
While the intuitive characterisations (1) and (2) plausibly allow us to latch onto the
intended notion of intrinsicality, they both analyse intrinsicality in terms of a notion—“how
x is, as opposed to how x is related to things wholly distinct from it or how things wholly
distinct from it are”—that is closely related to the notion of intrinsicality being analysed.
Indeed, they are so closely related that both characterisations are effectively circular.
Nearly every existing attempt to give a more philosophically satisfying analysis of in-
trinsicality has the consequence that, if two properties are necessarily coextensive, then
they are either both intrinsic or both extrinsic.3 This consequence, however, is plausibly
incompatible with a number of popular metaphysical theories. In particular, it is plausi-
bly incompatible with a number of popular metaphysical theories that hold that there are
necessary entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct entities.4
One example is number necessitarianism, which is the thesis that numbers necessarily
exist. Given this theory, the property of being self-identical is necessarily coextensive with
the property of being such that there is number.5 Since the former property is plausibly
intrinsic, whereas the latter property is plausibly extrinsic, there are plausibly necessarily
3A simple example is the duplication account endorsed by both David Lewis 1983a and G. E. Moore
1922. On Lewis’s version of this account, a property p is intrinsic iff, for any x and y that are duplicates, x
has p iff y has p. On this account, necessarily coextensive properties can’t differ in their intrinsicality since
they are instantiated by the same things, and hence are both shared by all duplicates, or both not shared
by all duplicates. Other attempts to analyse intrinsicality that fail to distinguish between necessarily
coextensive properties include the accounts of Lewis (1983b), Lewis (1986), Sider (1993), Langton and
Lewis (1998), Lewis (2001), Weatherson (2001), Vallentyne (1997), Yablo (1999), Denby (2006, 2010),
and Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). The account of Witmer et al. (2005) in terms of grounding, and the related
account of Trogdon (2009), might be able to distinguish between necessarily coextensive properties that
differ in their intrinsicality. However, as discussed in Marshall (2013), because these accounts require each
intrinsic property to be independent of accompaniment, these accounts face similar difficulties in being
compatible with theories which posit necessary entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct
entities. (p is independent of accompaniment iff i) possibly something accompanied has p; ii) possibly
something accompanied lacks p; iii) possibly something lonely has p; and iv) possibly something lonely
lacks p. x is accompanied iff it coexists with a wholly distinct contingently existing object; whereas, x is
lonely iff x is not accompanied.) One account that attempts to avoid these difficulties without appealing
to grounding is the account of Francescotti (1999), although see Weatherson and Marshall (2013) for
criticisms. Another account that aims to avoid these difficulities is given in Marshall (MS).
4A necessary entity is an entity that necessarily exists. There are reasons to think that the above
consequence is also false simpliciter, although these reasons are less compelling than those in favour of
the weaker claim that this consequence is incompatible with metaphysical theories that hold that there
are necessarily entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct entities. An argument that this
consequence is false simpliciter is the following: The property of being made of tin is necessarily coextensive
with the property of being made of tin and either next to Obama or not next to Obama. But, while the
former property is intrinsic, the latter property is intuitively extrinsic, since its ascription to anything
wholly distinct from Obama is not wholly about that thing, but also about what is the case beyond it.
Hence, there are necessarily coextensive properties that differ in their intrinsicality.
5I am assuming that each thing is necessarily self-identical. If this is not case then the example can be
modified.
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coextensive properties that differ in their intrinsicality, given number necessitarianism.
A second example is what I will call the standard theory of sets, which is the conjunction
of the necessitation of the standard cumulative theory of pure and impure sets, and the
necessitation of the thesis that, for any x, and for any ys that are the members of x,
necessarily: i) x exists iff each of the ys exist; ii) if x exists then the ys are the members of
x; and iii) x is wholly distinct from each of the ys. Given the standard theory of sets, the
intrinsic property of being made of tin is necessarily coextensive with the plausibly extrinsic
property of being made of tin and the member of a set.6 Hence, given the standard theory
of sets, it is also plausible that there are necessarily coextensive properties that differ in
their intrinsicality.7
The metaphysical notion of grounding promises to provide a solution to this problem. It
is often natural to use the locutions ‘grounded by’, ‘in virtue of’ and ‘is made true by’ when
doing philosophy, and it is natural to interpret at least some of these uses as expressing a
metaphysical, or non-causal, explanatory notion. For example, it is natural to say that a
moral theory aims to describe what makes certain acts right and certain other acts wrong
(or what grounds the rightness of certain acts and wrongness of certain other acts, or what
it is in virtue of that certain acts are right and certain other acts are wrong).8 For example,
one theory might hold that a particular act of lying is wrong in virtue of being a breach
of trust, while another theory might deny this and give an alternative account for why the
act is wrong. It is also natural to say that in giving an account of what makes an act right
or wrong (or what grounds the fact that an act is right or wrong, or what it is in virtue of
an act is right or wrong) a moral theorist is offering an explanation for why the act is right
or wrong. The explanation offered, however, is not a causal explanation, but is instead a
distinctively metaphysical type of explanation.
A number of philosophers have recently argued that this natural talk should be regarded
as both intelligible and as legitimate to employ when doing serious philosophy, even if we
cannot analyse the relevant notion of grounding in terms of other notions, such as meta-
physical necessity or supervenience. Moreover, they argue that if we do employ the notion
of grounding we will be able to do important philosophical work we can’t do otherwise.9
6Given the standard theory of sets, the property of being made of tin and the member of a set is
plausibly extrinsic, since a true ascription of the property to a thing is partly about how that thing is
related to things wholly distinct from it. This is because, according to the standard theory of sets, sets
are wholly distinct from their members.
7Proponents of accounts that rule out there being necessarily coextensive properties differing in their
intrinsicality are well aware that their accounts are incompatible with these metaphysical theories, given
the intuitive judgements of intrinsicality appealed to above. They typically respond by claiming that,
despite their intuitive appeal, these judgements should be rejected. See Eddon (2011) for a thorough
critique of this response. I will assume here that this response is unsatisfactory.
8See Rosen (2010).
9Philosophers who who endorse this positive view of grounding include Rosen 2010, Fine 2001; 2012,
Schaffer 2009, and Raven 2012. Different proponents of grounding have different accounts of grounding and
may also have somewhat different notions of grounding in mind. The notion of grounding I am concerned
here with is the notion employed, for example, by Rosen, and I will assume that Rosen’s account of
grounding is essentially correct.
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A prime example of this work according to a number of proponents of grounding is that of
analysing intrinsicality.
The notion of grounding promises to enable an analysis of intrinsicality that allows there
to be necessarily coextensive properties that differ in their intrinsicality, and hence promises
to enable an analysis of intrinsicality that is compatible with popular metaphysical theories
according to which there are necessary entities such as numbers, or necessary connections
between wholly distinct entities such as sets and their members. The reason for this
is that grounding is a hyperintensional notion: two facts that are necessarily equivalent
can differ in what facts they ground and what facts ground them. For example, certain
necessary moral facts might be grounded by certain other necessary moral facts, without
being grounded by every necessary fact. Similarly, given numbers necessarily exist, the
fact that there is a number is plausibly grounded by the necessary fact that the number 10
exists (as well as being grounded by other similar facts, such as the fact that the number 2
exists), but it is not grounded by other necessary facts, such as the fact that either there is
an electron or there no electron. Since grounding is a hyperintensional relation, it is able
to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties, while other notions, such as
metaphysical necessity and supervenience, cannot. According to a number of proponents
of grounding, this fact enables the notion of grounding to provide a successful analysis of
intrinsicality.
In this paper I will argue that this promise is illusory. In particular, I will argue
that accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding are also incompatible with popular
metaphysical theories that hold that there are necessary entities or necessary connections
between wholly distinct entities. In section 2, I will describe Gideon Rosen’s recent elegant
and powerful account in terms of gounding. Rosen’s account is one of the purest accounts
of intrinsicality in terms of grounding that has been proposed, and it is arguably the
account that most promises to be compatible with metaphysical theories such as number
necessitarianism and standard set theory that hold that there are necessary entities or
necessary connections between wholly distinct entities.10 In section 3, however, I will
argue that Rosen’s account fails to be compatible with these theories and hence fails to
make good on this promise. In section 4, I will then argue that the manner in which Rosen’s
account fails suggests that any attempt to analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding is
likely to suffer the same fate. Given we want an account of intrinsicality that is compatible
with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities or necessary connections
between wholly distinct entities, it is therefore likely that grounding accounts will be no
more successful than other existing accounts.11
10The accounts of Witmer et al. (2005) and Trogdon (2009), which also attempt to analyse intrinsicality
in terms of grounding, are less pure than Rosen’s, since, as noted in footnote 3, they require that each
intrinsic property satisfy the modal condition of being independent of accompaniment. A principle pre-
supposed by both these accounts is discussed in footnote 30. Another account of intrinsicality in terms of
grounding, which is similar to Rosen’s, is given by Bader MS.
11Why should one want an account of intrinsicality that is compatible with these metaphysical theories?
Many philosophers, probably the large majority of philosophers, will want such an account because they
think that at least one of these metaphysical theories is true. For such philosophers it will be a requirement
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Before proceeding, it is important to recognise that some uses of ‘in virtue’, ‘grounds’
and ‘makes true’ might fail to express the explanatory notion of grounding described above.
In particular, it is important to realise that, on its intended reading, ‘in virtue’ does not
express the explanatory notion of grounding in the intuitive characterisation of intrinsicality
given by (1).12 That ‘in virtue’ in (1) does not express the explanatory notion of grounding
on its intended interpretation follows from (1) being true on its intended interpretation,
together with (3) and (4).
3. ‘a is F in virtue of how it is (as opposed to how it is related to things wholly distinct
from it or how things wholly distinct from it are)’ is true iff, for some predicate G
expressing an intrinsic property of the referent of a, ‘a is F in virtue of a being G’ is
true, where ‘in virtue’ has the reading it has on the intended interpretation of (1).
4. There are true sentences of the form ‘a is F ’, where F expresses an intrinsic prop-
erty, and ‘a is F ’ expresses a fact that is foundational in the sense of not being
(explanatorily) grounded by any other facts.
To see why this is the case, suppose (as we can given (4)) that a predicate F expresses an
intrinsic property and ‘a is F ’ expresses a foundational fact. Then, by (1) and (3), there
must be a predicate G such that ‘a is F in virtue of a being G’ is true, where ‘in virtue’ has
the reading it has on the intended interpretation of (1). Since no fact can explain itself, it
follows from grounding being an explanatory notion that no fact can ground itself.13 But
since the fact expressed by ‘a is F ’ is foundational, and facts can’t ground themselves, it
follows that ‘in virtue’ can’t express the explanatory notion of grounding on the intended
interpretation of (1).14
The fact that ‘in virtue’ does not express the explanatory notion of grounding in (1)
is important for two reasons. First, if ‘in virtue’ did express the explanatory notion of
on the truth of an account of intrinsicality that it is not incompatible with these theories. Even if one
rejects all of these metaphysical theories, one might still want an account of intrinsicality that is compatible
with them because either: i) one wants an analysis of intrinsicality that is conceptually necessary, and,
since these metaphysical theories are conceptually possible, this requires the analysis to be compatible
with these theories; or ii) one wants an account of what properties are intrinsic that can be used under
the supposition that these theories are true.
12This fact is not widely appreciated. Rather, it seems to be commonly held that ‘in virtue’ does express
the explanatory notion of grounding in intuitive characterisations of intrinsicality such as (1).
13Rosen, for example, endorses the principle that no fact can ground itself for this reason (Rosen, 2010,
pp. 115-116). I am assuming with Rosen that being an explanation of is a relation on facts, rather than
being a relation on more fine grain entities such as sentences or facts under modes of presentation.
14Fine 2012 has distinguished between a strict notion of grounding, which is the notion I am using
‘ground’ to express here, and a weak notion of grounding. A referee has suggested that, on the intended
reading of (1), ‘in virtue’ expresses Fine’s weak notion of grounding, rather than the strict notion. This
suggestion escapes the above argument, since, unlike in the case of strict grounding, facts can weakly
ground themselves. It is, however, arguably shown to be false by the kind of examples discussed in section
3. For example, given the existence of sets strictly ground, and hence weakly ground, the existence of
their members, and given sets are wholly distinct from their members, (5), understood with ‘in virtue’
expressing weak grounding, falsely classifies the extrinsic property of being a member of something as
intrinsic.
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grounding in (1), then (1) would provide an analysis of intrinsicality in terms of grounding,
albeit one having the drawback of circularity described above, and this would provide a
reason to think that a more satisfactory analysis of intrinsicality in terms of grounding
might also be able to be given. Second, failure to recognise that ‘in virtue’ does not
express the explanatory notion of grounding in (1) can to lead to significant confusion.
To avoid confusing the different senses of ‘in virtue’, I will mainly appeal to the intuitive
characterisation of intrinsicality given by (2) in the following, rather than that given by
(1).
2 Rosen’s account
Rosen’s formulation of his account of intrinsicality presupposes a Russellian theory of
facts.15 According to Russellianism about facts, facts are structured entities that are built
up out of individuals, properties and operators in roughly the way sentences are built up
out of names, predicates and operator expressions. If φ is a true sentence made up of
names, predicates and operator expressions, and the syntactical structure of φ matches
the semantic structure of the fact s it expresses, then the individual constituents of s
are the referents of the names in φ, the property constituents of s are the properties
expressed by the predicates in φ, and the operator constituents are the operators expressed
by the operator expressions in φ. For example, given ‘Obama runs’ is true, and given the
surface syntactical structure of ‘Obama runs’ matches the semantic structure of the fact
s it expresses, Obama is an individual constituent of s, while the property of running is
a property constituent of s.16 Given this background, Rosen’s account can be stated as
(5).17
5. p is an intrinsic property =df p is a property and, necessarily, for any x and y: i) if the
ascription of p to x is grounded by a fact f that has y as an individual constituent,
then y is part of x; and ii) if the ascription of the negation of p to x is grounded by
a fact f that has y as an individual constituent, then y is part of x.
15I am taking a fact to be an obtaining state of affairs, where, as noted in footnote 2, a state of affairs
is a way things are or a way things fail to be. A fact, then, is a way things are. Given one endorses the
Russellian theory of facts, it is natural to also endorse a Russellian theory of states of affairs.
16This is my terminology rather than Rosen’s.
17(5) is a cleaned up version of the formulation Rosen himself gives in Rosen (2010). What Rosen
actually writes is:
F is an intrinsic property iff, as a matter of necessity, for all x: If x is F in virtue of ϕ(y)—
where ϕ(y) is a fact containing y as a constituent—then y is a part of x; and If x is not-F in
virtue of ϕ(y), then y is part of x.(Rosen, 2010, p. 112)
I have interpreted Rosen as using the locution ‘is a fact containing y as a constituent’ to mean ‘is a fact
containing y as an individual constituent’. If he instead meant ‘is a fact containing y as either an individual
constituent, property constituent or operator constituent’, then his account would fail given any view that
holds that properties aren’t parts of the things that have them.
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Rosen’s account plausibly successfully classifies many properties as intrinsic or extrinsic.
Consider, for example, the property of being next to something. Rosen’s account plausibly
correctly classifies this property as extrinsic since it is plausibly possible for there to be an
x and a y such that the fact that x is next to something is grounded by the fact that x is
next to y, where y is an individual constituent of the latter fact that is not part of x. The
account also plausibly correctly classifies the property of being lonely as extrinsic, where
something is lonely iff it does not coexist with any contingently existing entity wholly
distinct from itself. The account plausibly classifies this property as extrinsic since it is
plausibly possible for there to be an x and a y such that the fact that x is not lonely is
grounded by the fact that y is a contingently existing entity that is wholly distinct from x,
where y is an individual constituent of the latter fact that is not part of x. At least prima
facie, it is also plausible that Rosen’s account correctly classifies the property of being tin
as intrinsic since i) necessarily, for any tin x, the fact that x is made of tin is plausibly
grounded only by facts whose individual constituents are part of x, and ii) necessarily, for
any non-tin x, the fact that x is not made of tin is plausibly grounded only by facts whose
individual constituents are part of x.
Importantly, Rosen’s account is able to distinguish between necessarily coextensive
properties that differ in their intrinsicality; whereas, as noted above, nearly all rival ac-
counts cannot. For example, Rosen’s account is able to correctly classify the property of
being self-identical as intrinsic, while correctly classifying the property of being such that
there is a number as extrinsic, even if these properties are necessarily coextensive due to
the necessary existence of numbers. Rosen’s account plausibly classifies being such that
there is a number as extrinsic since it is plausibly possible for there to be an x and a y
such that the fact that x is such that there is a number is grounded by the fact that y is
a number, where y is an individual constituent of this latter fact that is not part of x. On
the other hand, it plausibly classifies being self-identical as intrinsic since it is plausibly
necessary that, for any x, the fact that x is self-identical is either grounded by no facts, or
is only grounded by facts whose individual constituents are parts of x.
Given sets are wholly distinct from their members, Rosen’s account is also able to
correctly classify the intrinsic property of being made of tin and a member of a set as
extrinsic. This property is classified as extrinsic by Rosen’s account since it is possible for
there to be an x and a y such that the fact that x is made of tin and a member of a set is
grounded by the fact that x is made of tin and x is a member of y, where y is an individual
constituent of the latter fact that is not part of x. Given Rosen’s account can correctly
classify being made of tin as intrinsic, the account is therefore able to correctly classify
both this property and the extrinsic property of being made of tin and a member of a set,
even if these properties are necessarily coextensive as they are if the standard theory of
sets is correct.
It is important to note that Rosen’s formulation of his account is not only committed to
Russellianism about facts, but also to a particularly fine grain version of this theory. This
commitment arises from how the account treats foundational facts.18 As noted in section
18Recall that a foundational fact is a fact that is not grounded by any other facts.
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2, since no fact can explain itself, it follows from grounding being an explanatory notion
that no fact can ground itself. This irreflexivity of grounding, however, raises a problem
for Rosen’s account given, as is widely believed, some facts are foundational.19
Suppose R expresses a two place relation r such that, necessarily, any true ascription
of r to things x and y is a foundational fact, and any true ascription of the negation of
r to x and y is also a foundational fact.2021Let p be the extrinsic property expressed by
‘λxR(x,Obama)’. Then, given that the ascription of p to any object y is identical to the
ascription of r to y and Obama, and given that the ascription of the negation of p to any
object y is identical to the ascription of the negation of r to y and Obama, Rosen’s account
will falsely classify p as intrinsic.22 p will be classified as intrinsic on Rosen’s account since,
necessarily, any true ascription of it or its negation to an x will be foundational, and hence
there won’t be any fact that grounds it having an individual constituent that is not part
of x.
This problem does not arise given an account that holds that the true ascription of r
to x and y is a different fact from the true ascription of p to x. Given such an account,
a proponent of Rosen’s account can argue that p is classified as extrinsic, since it’s true
ascription to an object y that is wholly distinct from Obama is grounded by the ascription
of r to y and Obama, and this latter fact has an individual constituent that is not part of
y, namely Obama. However, it would be good to have a version of Rosen’s account that
doesn’t rely on such an account, or on the above claim about grounding. A natural way
of doing this is to modify Rosen’s account by replacing (5) with (6).
6. p is an intrinsic property =df p is a property and, necessarily, for any x and y: i)
if the ascription of p to x is grounded by, or identical to, a fact f that has y as an
individual constituent, then y is part of x; and ii) if the ascription of the negation of
p to x is grounded by, or identical to, a fact f that has y as an individual constituent,
then y is part of x.
As well as avoiding commitment to a fine grain Russellian theory of facts, it would be
good to be able to formulate Rosen’s account so that it avoids commitment to Russellianism
altogether, and so is compatible with non-Russellian theories of facts such as theories that
hold that facts are unstructured entities such as sets of circumstances or sets of worlds.
This can be done as follows. Whatever theory of facts one endorses, one should be able to
distinguish between facts that are qualitative, in the sense that they do not concern any
particular entities, and facts that are non-qualitative, in the sense that they do concern
particular entities. The fact that there is a cube and the fact that every emerald is green
are examples of qualitative facts. The fact that Obama is president and the fact that
19For discussion over whether there must be foundational facts, see Cameron (2008).
20If the predicate R expresses a two-place relation r, and names a and b refer to x and y respectively,
then the ascription of r to x and y is the state of affairs expressed by pRabq.
21A possible example of such a relation would be a fundamental two place relation whose instantiation
is modally independent of the instantiation of any other fundamental properties and relations.
22Given footnote 20, the ascription of p to a y is identical to the ascription of r to y and Obama iff
p(λxR(x,Obama))bq expresses the same fact as pR(b,Obama)q, where b is a name referring to y.
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Obama works with Clinton, on the other hand, are examples of non-qualitative facts.
Given the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative facts is granted, however,
we should also grant the notion of a fact concerning certain entities, so that, for example,
the fact that Obama is president concerns Obama, while the fact that Obama works with
Clinton concerns both Obama and Clinton.23 Given this notion, we can reformulate Rosen’s
account so that it is compatible with anti-Russellian theories of facts by replacing (6) with
(7).
7. p is an intrinsic property =df p is a property and, necessarily, for any x and y: i) if
the ascription of p to x is grounded by, or identical to, a fact f that concerns y, then
y is part of x; and ii) if the ascription of the negation of p to x is grounded by, or
identical to, a fact f that concerns y, then y is part of x.
Rosen’s account, then, is both able to successfully classify the intrinsicality of many
properties and able to be formulated so to be neutral between different theories of facts.
In the next section, however, I will argue that it fails to be compatible with popular
metaphysical theories that hold that there are necessary entities or necessary connections
between entities. In giving this argument, I will focus on the most neutral formulation
of Rosen’s account given by (7). The argument, however, applies equally to the more
committed versions of Rosen’s account given by (5) and (6).24
23The notion of a fact concerning some objects x1,. . . , xn is distinct from the notion discussed in section
2 of a fact being wholly about some objects x1,. . . , xn. In order to clearly distinguish these notions, we
might use ‘haecceistically concern’ to express the first notion, while using ‘intrinsically about’ to express
the second notion. These notions are orthogonal to each other in the sense that each of the four following
cases are possible. First, a fact might both haecceistically concern an object and be intrinsically about
the object. For example, the fact that Obama is 6.1 feet tall both haecceistically concerns Obama and
is intrinsically about Obama (given spatial relations are intrinsic). Second, a fact might haecceistically
concern an object without being intrinsically about that object. For example, the fact that Obama is taller
than most men haecceistically concerns Obama, but is not intrinsically about Obama, since, in addition
to being about how Obama intrinsically is, it is also about how things are outside of Obama. Third, a fact
might be intrinsically about an object without haecceistically concerning it. For example, the fact that
Obama is 6.1 feet tall is intrinsically about the solar system, since it is wholly about how a part of the
solar system is. It does not, however, haecceistically concern the solar system, but rather Obama. Finally,
a fact may fail to haecceistically concern an object and also fail to be intrinsically about it as well. For
example, the fact that Obama is 6.1 feet tall neither haecceistically concerns Clinton nor is intrinsically
about Clinton.
24Another objection to Rosen’s account is that it, like a number of other accounts, fails to correctly
classify intrinsic non-qualitative properties such as being Obama. The non-qualitative property of being
Obama is intuitively intrinsic since, necessarily, anything that is Obama is Obama in virtue of how he
is, as opposed to how he is related to things wholly distinct from him or in virtue of how things wholly
distinct from him are. Or, appealing to the intuitive characterisation of intrinsicality (2) that does not
involve the locution ‘in virtue’, the property of being Obama is intuitively intrinsic since, necessarily, any
true ascription of being Obama to a thing is wholly about that thing, as opposed to being at least partly
about how that thing is related to things wholly distinct from it or how things wholly distinct from it
are. Rosen’s account, however, falsely classifies such non-qualitative intrinsic properties as extrinsic. For
example, as formulated in (7), Rosen’s account classifies being Obama as extrinsic since the true ascription
of the negation of this property to Clinton concerns an entity, namely Obama, who is wholly distinct from
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3 Against Rosen’s account
In this section I will argue that Rosen’s account is incompatible with a number of metaphys-
ical theories that hold that there are necessary entities or necessary connections between
wholly distinct entities. The key idea behind the argument is that, given these meta-
physical theories, it is plausible that some facts about some things are grounded by facts
about other wholly distinct things, and that this is incompatible with Rosen’s account. I
will primarily limit myself to arguing that Rosen’s account is incompatible with number
necessitarianism and standard set theory. Similar arguments can be given to show that
his account is also incompatible with other popular metaphysical theories that hold that
there are necessary entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct entities.25
Consider first the standard theory of sets. Given this theory, it is plausible that facts
about sets are explained by facts about their members. For example, given standard set
theory, it is plausible that the fact that {Obama} exists is explained by the fact that Obama
exists, perhaps conjoined with the fact that it is a law that all things have singleton sets
and the fact that it is essential to {Obama} that it be the singleton set of Obama. Since
this is not a causal explanation, it is therefore plausible to hold that, given the standard
theory of sets, the fact that {Obama} exists is grounded by the fact that Obama exists
(perhaps conjoined with the law that all things have singleton sets and the fact that it is
essential to {Obama} that it is the singleton set of Obama). If this is the case, then, given
the standard theory of sets, Rosen’s account classifies the property of existing as extrinsic,
since, given this theory, the fact that {Obama} exists is grounded by a fact concerning
Obama, where a Obama is not a part of {Obama}. However, the property of existing is
intrinsic, since the ascription of existence to an x describes how x is, as opposed to how x
is related to things wholly distinct from it or how things wholly distinct from it are. Given
the standard theory of sets, then, Rosen’s account plausibly falsely classifies existence as
extrinsic.26
Clinton. A proponent of Rosen’s account might reply to this objection by claiming that Rosen’s account
should be construed as an account of qualitative intrinsicality, and that we can analyse intrinsicality
simpliciter in terms of qualitative intrinsicality using some further account. If the argument in section
3 is correct, however, then Rosen’s account fails even as an account of qualitative intrinsicality, given
metaphysical theories that hold that there are necessary entities or necessary connections between wholly
distinct entities. For a further objection to Rosen’s account see footnote 29.
25Examples of such theories arguably include: i) contingentist sparse theories of properties, according to
which, for example, necessarily, the property of redness exists iff there something that is red; ii) Russellian
theories of facts that hold that a fact can only exist if its individual constituents exist; and iii) essentialist
theories that hold that which parents a person has is essential to them. The last example was suggested
to me by an anonymous referee.
26For an example that does not involve the property of existence, consider the standard theory of sets
conjoined with the necessitation of mereological universalism (the thesis that, for any xs, there is a fusion
of the xs), and the view that, necessarily, sets are located where their members are located. Suppose x
and y are objects that are 1 m apart, and let z be the fusion of the singleton sets {x} and {y}. Given this
conjoined metaphysical thesis, the fact that z has two parts that are 1 m apart is plausibly grounded by
the fact that x and y are 1 m apart (perhaps conjoined with the relevant mereological and location laws,
and the relevant facts about essences). Since this latter fact concerns x and y, which are not parts of z,
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The argument that Rosen’s account is incompatible with number necessitarianism is
similar. Given number necessitarianism, it is plausible that it is a law that each number
has a successor, and, given this, it is plausible that the existence of each number n + 1 is
grounded by the existence of its preceding number n (perhaps conjoined with the law that
each number has a successor and the fact that it is essential to n+1 that it is the successor
of n).27 Given this, however, and the plausible claim that 2 is wholly distinct from 1, it
follows that Rosen’s account falsely classifies the property of existing as extrinsic, since the
fact that 2 exists is grounded by a fact concerning 1, where 1 is not a part of 2.
In the face of these arguments, a proponent of Rosen’s account might deny that the
above laws and grounding claims obtain given standard set theory and number necessitar-
ianism. Moreover, they might claim that, given these metaphysical theories, there aren’t
any similar laws and grounding claims that connect wholly distinct things in the way the
above laws and grounding claims do which might be used to argue for the incompatibility
of Rosen’s account with these metaphysical theories. The denial of all such laws given these
metaphysical theories, however, is highly unpalatable, since it would lead to a great many
facts being taken to be explanatory brute which would otherwise be able to be explained.
Such an explanatorily impoverished position is likely to be rejected by grounding theorists
who are proponents of Rosen’s account.
A second response a proponent of Rosen’s account might adopt is to modify Rosen’s
account by replacing (7) with (8), where ‘x is a generalised part of y’ abbreviates ‘x is
either a part of y, or a member of y, or a predecessor of y’.28
8. p is a intrinsic property =df p is a property and, necessarily, for any x and y: i) if the
ascription of p to x is grounded by, or identical to, a fact f that concerns y, then y is
a generalised part of x; and ii) if the ascription of the negation of p to x is grounded
by, or identical to, a fact f that concerns y, then y is a generalised part of x.
The replacement of (7) with (8) blocks the above arguments. In the first case, this is
because Obama is a member of {Obama}, and hence is a generalised part of {Obama}.
The existence of {Obama} being grounded by the existence of Obama (perhaps conjoined
with the law that all things have singleton sets and the fact that it is essential to {Obama}
that it is the singleton set of Obama) therefore does not entail that (8) classifies existence
as extrinsic. In the second case, this is because 1 is the the predecessor of 2, and hence is
a generalised part of 2. As a result, the existence of 2 being grounded by the existence of
1 (perhaps conjoined with the law that each number has a successor and the fact that it is
it follows that, given the conjoined metaphysical thesis, and given distance relations are intrinsic, Rosen’s
account falsely classifies the intrinsic property of having two parts that are 1 m apart as extrinsic. An
intrinsic n-place relation is roughly a relation n things stand in in virtue of how they are and how they
are related to each other, as opposed to how they are related to things wholly distinct from them or how
things wholly distinct from them are. If being 1 m from is extrinsic, we can replace this relation with
another similar relation, such as the relation we would call ‘the property of being 1 m from’ in a possible
world where Newtonian physics obtains, and where the relations we call ‘distance relations’ are intrinsic.
27Or at least this is the case given numbers are sui generis entities. If numbers are reducible to sets, then
the plausibility of these grounding claims will depend on what particular reduction to sets is endorsed.
28This response was suggested to me by a referee.
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essential to 2 that it is the successor of 1) also does not entail that (8) classifies existence
as extrinsic.
Unfortunately, there are two serious problems with this proposal. The first problem is
that we will need to add more disjuncts to the definition of ‘generalised part’ for Rosen’s
account to be compatible with other metaphysical theories that posit necessarily entities or
necessary connections between wholly distinct entities. For example, given certain theories
of properties and Russellian facts, it is plausible that facts about properties and Russellian
facts are grounded by their instances and constituents respectively. If they are so grounded
given these theories, then to make Rosen’s account compatible with these theories, we will
therefore need to redefine ‘x is a generalised part of y’ as ‘x is either a part of y, a member
of y, a predecessor of y, an instance of y, or a constituent of y’. Moreover, since there
might be no limit to the number of metaphysical theories we might want Rosen’s account
to be compatible with, there might be no limit to the number of disjuncts we will need to
add, making the formulation of a satisfactory version of Rosen’s account impossible.
The second problem with the above response is that (8) fails, even if number necessitar-
ianism and standard set theory are the only metaphysical theories we need to worry about
making the account compatible with. The reason for this is that, given these metaphys-
ical theories, (8) appears to falsely classify the extrinsic properties having a member and
having a predecessor as intrinsic. For example, (8) plausibly classifies having a member as
intrinsic since, for any x, the fact that x has a member does not appear to be grounded
by any fact that concerns something that is not a generalised part of x. Similarly, (8)
plausibly classifies having a predecessor as intrinsic since, for any x, the fact that x has a
predecessor does not appear to be grounded by any facts that concern anything that is not
a generalised part of x.
Both the above responses on behalf of Rosen’s account therefore fail. In light of these
failures, it is plausible that Rosen’s account is indeed incompatible with metaphysical
theories that posit necessary entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct
entities, and that there is no simple way of modifying the account so that it is compatible
with such theories.29
29Rosen’s account faces a further objection which potentially shows that his account fails whether or not
the above metaphysical theories obtain. Independently of whether there are necessary entities or necessary
connections between wholly distinct entities, it might be thought plausible that there are some qualitative
necessary foundational facts, the most obvious candidates being qualitative foundational necessary laws.
(I am assuming that laws are facts of a certain type.) The existence of such facts, however, appears to be
incompatible with Rosen’s account. To see why, suppose φ expresses a necessary qualitative foundational
fact f , and let p be the property expressed by ‘λxφ’. So, for example, if φ is the sentence ‘It is a law that
every act of lying is wrong’, then p is the property of being such that it is a law that every act of lying
is wrong. Suppose an object x has p. Then, since f is foundational, the ascription of p to x is plausibly
either itself foundational or is grounded by f . Either way, the ascription of p to x is plausibly neither
identical to, nor grounded by, any fact that concerns something that is not part of x. Hence, the first part
of (7) is satisfied:
Necessarily, for any x and y, if the ascription of p to x is grounded by, or identical to, a fact
f that concerns y, then y is part of x.
Since f is necessary, no x can fail to have p. Hence, the second part of (8) is trivially satisfied. Hence,
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4 Other grounding accounts
I have argued that Rosen’s attempt to analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding fails to
be compatible with a number of popular metaphysical theories that hold that there are
necessary entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct entities. I have also
argued that there is no obvious way to modify Rosen’s account so that it is compatible
with these theories. Given these arguments are correct, these failures should reduce our
confidence that a grounding account of intrinsicality can be given that is compatible with
these theories. More importantly, the manner in which Rosen’s account fails to be com-
patible with these theories suggests a general reason to think that no grounding account
of intrinsicality can be given that is compatible with these theories.
If intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of grounding there should be relatively simple
principles linking intrinsicality with grounding, which might be exploited to obtain the
analysis. One possibility is (9).
9. If a fact f is wholly about an x, and f is grounded by a fact g, then g is wholly about
x
The considerations used to argue against Rosen’s account in section 3, however, can be
used to show that (9) fails given metaphysical theories that hold that there are necessary
entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct entities. For example, as argued
in section 3, given the standard theory of sets, the fact that {Obama} exists is grounded
by the fact that Obama exists (perhaps conjoined with the law that things have singleton
sets and the fact that it is essential to {Obama} that it is the singleton set of Obama). But
while the fact that {Obama} exists is wholly about {Obama}, the fact that Obama exists
is not wholly about {Obama} (nor is the conjunction of this fact with the law that things
have singleton sets and the fact that it is essential to {Obama} that it is the singleton set
of Obama).30
Rosen’s account classifies p as intrinsic. However, since f is a qualitative, or general, fact, the ascription of
p to an object not only describes how that object is, but also describes how things wholly distinct from that
object are. Hence p is extrinsic, and its classification as intrinsic by Rosen’s account is mistaken. (Unlike
the objection discussed in the main text, this objection does not appear to generalise to all attempts to
analyse intrinsicality in terms of grounding.)
30Witmer et al. 2005 have endorsed a principle in the vicinity of (9). Their principle is, in effect, (A),
where p partially grounds q iff p is among some facts that collectively ground q.
A. For any x, for any intrinsic property p, and for any property q, if the fact that x has p is (at least
partially) grounded by the fact that x has q, then q is intrinsic
A problem with (A) is that, given standard realist theories of properties, facts wholly about concrete
objects should ground facts about what properties concrete objects instantiate, rather than vice versa.
For example, while the fact that an object is a red plausibly grounds the fact that it instantiates the
property of being red given standard realist property theories, the fact that the object instantiates the
property of being red doesn’t ground the fact that the object is red. Given this, ‘The fact that a has the
property of being F is grounded by the fact that b has the property of being G’ plausibly does not generally
follow from ‘The fact that Fa is grounded by the fact that Gb’, and this provides a general reason to think
that (A) is false.
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Given how I am using ‘wholly about’, if p is wholly about x, and x is part of y, then p
is wholly about y. Given this, (9) is equivalent to (10).31
10. If a fact f is wholly about an x, and f is grounded by a fact g, then there is a part
y of x such that g is wholly about y
In light of the above problem with (9), we might modify (9) by appealing to the notion of a
generalised part discussed in section 3. In particular, we might replace (9) with (11), which
is obtained from (10) by replacing ‘part’ with ‘generalised part’, where ‘x is a generalised
part is y’ has the definition ‘x is either a part of y, a member of y, or a predecessor of y’.
11. If a fact f is wholly about an x, and f is grounded by a fact g, then there is a
generalised part y of x such that g is wholly about y
As in the case of the analogous modification of Rosen’s account discussed in section 3,
however, if this strategy is to work we will need to add extra disjuncts to the definition of
‘generalised part’ to render (11) compatible with other metaphysical theories that hold that
there are necessary entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, and
it is not clear whether one could come up with the entire list of needed disjuncts. Moreover,
the fact that the analogous modification of Rosen’s account misclassifies extrinsic properties
as intrinsic suggests that even if we could formulate a verson of (11) that was compatible
with all the relevant metaphysical theories, it would be too weak to be of much help in
analysing intrinsicality.
Another possible principle linking intrinsicality with grounding is (12).
12. If a fact f is wholly about an x, and f grounds a fact g, then g is wholly about x
(12), however, can also be seen to fail given the plausible view (endorsed by many grounding
theorists including Rosen) that at least some facts expressed by disjunctions are grounded
by the facts expressed by their disjuncts. For example, the fact that either Obama is 6.1
This problem can be avoided by replacing (A) with (B).
B. For any x, for any intrinsic property p, and for any property q, if the ascription of p to x is (at least
partly) grounded by the ascription of q to x, then q is intrinsic
Unfortunately, however, (B) faces similar problems as (9). Consider, for example, the standard theory of
sets conjoined with the necessitation of mereological unversalism and the thesis that, necessarily, sets are
located where their members are. Suppose x and y are 1 m apart, and let z be the fusion of the singleton
set {x} and {y}. Then, as noted in footnote 26, the fact that z has two parts that are 1 m apart is plausibly
grounded by the fact that x and y are 1 m apart (perhaps conjoined with the relevant mereological and
location laws, and the relevant facts about essences). Hence, it is plausible that the ascription to z of the
intrinsic property of having two parts that are 1 m apart is grounded by the ascription to z of the extrinsic
property of having two parts that have members that are 1 m apart. However, this conflicts with (B).
((B) can also be argued to be incompatible with standard set theory without being augmented by theses
about mereology and location. The argument, however, relies on the claim that, given standard set theory,
the existence of {Obama} is grounded by {Obama} being such that Obama exists, which is perhaps more
contentious than the corresponding grounding claim above.)
31As I am using ‘part’, each thing is an (improper) part of itself.
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feet tall or Clinton is 10 feet tall is plausibly grounded by the fact that Obama is 6.1 feet
tall. But while the fact that Obama is 6.1 feet tall is wholly about Obama, the fact that
either Obama is 6.1 feet tall or Clinton is 10 feet tall is not wholly about Obama, but is
rather wholly about Obama and Clinton.
Principles (9), (11) and (12), therefore, either fail to be compatible with metaphysical
theories that posit necessary entities or necessary connections between wholly distinct
entities, or are too weak to help provide an analysis of intrinsicality. In light this failure,
it seems unlikely that there are any other principles linking intrinsicality and grounding
that do any better. Without such principles, however, it is unlikely that intrinsicality can
be analysed in terms of grounding in a way that is compatible with these metaphysical
theories.
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